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The first objective of the study examines the announcement effects on resale of treasury shares among 
public listed firms in Malaysia. All firms that resale their treasury shares between 2001 and 2012 are 
examined using standard event methodologies namely market adjusted return (MAR) and market 
model (MM). The finding reveals that resale firms experience significant positive 4% abnormal 
returns in 5 days prior to the actual resale of treasury shares. There is no abnormal gains realize 
following the actual resale of treasury shares date suggesting that market is semi-strongly efficient 
where prices can fully reflect all publicly available information. The second objective is to assess the 
relationships between three companies' financial characteristics and the magnitude of shares resale, 
which is the percentage of shares resale in the open market (PRESALE). Based on signaling theory, it 
is found that both prior returns and current EPS are positively and significantly affecting the 
percentage of treasury shares resold in the market while LAGEPS has a negative and significant 
relationship with PRESALE. 
Keywords: Share buybacks, abnormal returns, treasury shares resale, Malaysia 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Share repurchases or share buybacks has been allowed in Malaysia after the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. Since then many Malaysian firms have embarked on buying back their own shares (Abdul Latif, 
2010, Mansor, Zaidi & Siew Peng ,201 1; Abdul Latif & Taufil Mohd., 2013, Abdul Latif, Taufil 
Mohd., Wan Hussin & Ku Ismail, 2013). 
A number of studies have been carried on the announcement effects of share repurchases, yet very 
limited studies have been conducted on other share repurchases activities such as treasury shares 
resale'or cancel. To the authors' knowledge, this is the one of limited study to assess the price effect 
on resale of treasury shares using Malaysian companies. 
There are four reasons on why this study is important. Firstly, empirical evidence on the effects of 
resale of treasury shares in developed and emerging market is limited. This is due to data availability 
and stringent regulation imposed on repurchasing firms to resale their shares in many market such as 
in the US (Cesari, Espenlaub & Kurshed, 201 1). In contrast to US rules, Malaysia companies enjoy 
more liberal rules to resale their treasury shares in the open market. Furthermore, Malaysian 
companies are required to furnish appropriate disclosures to the public thus making it is possible to 
I Resale or reissue of treasury shares will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
available, there are also lack of discussion on the theoretical reasons of why companies resale their 
treasury shares. Thirdly, it is found that there is an increasing and significant trend of companies that 
reissue or resale their treasury shares in Malaysia. The current study documents that in 2001, there 
were only 10 resale of treasury share events by Malaysia companies and the events has accumulated to 
be 629 by 2012, an increase of 63 percent. Previous evidence indicates that corporate policy related 
events such as investment, operation, and payout have information content and value implication. For 
example, decision to invest in research and development (Lakanishok & Sougiannis, 2001) and 
decision to repurchase shares (Ikenberry, Lakanishok & Vermaelen, 1995) bring about significant 
changes to companies prices. Given that there is an increasing trend in resale events among Malaysian 
firms from 2001 to 2012, it is argued that there must be information content in the event. For example, 
are companies reselling their treasury shares to correct mispricing? Fourthly, Malaysian corporate 
environment is different from many of the developed market. For instance Malaysian firms are 
known for its concentrated ownership structures and family ownership (see for example, Abdul Latif, 
Taufil Mohd., &, Saleh, 2013; Kamardin, Abdul Latif, Taufil Mohd, & Che Adam, 2014). Therefore 
the determinants and effects of corporate policy and events could be very different from those of the 
developed market. Hence this study would provide empirical evidence needed on the resale of treasury 
shares in a concentrated ownership environment. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses important rules regarding share repurchases in 
Malaysia followed by discussion on literature reviews and hypothesis development. Section 3 presents 
methods employed for the study. The empirical findings are discussed in section 4. Finally a summary 
of the findings, conclusion, limitation and future avenues for research are discussed in section 5. 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Rulings on buyback, resale of treasury shares. 
As compared to the US companies, Malaysian companies enjoy considerable autonomy on conducting 
resale of treasury shares as long as they have been tabled and approved in the company's annual 
general meeting and fulfilled all procedures and disclosures requirements as stipulated in Chapter 9 
and Chapter 12 of Bursa Listing Requirement (2012). Companies in the US can only sell their treasury 
shares in the open market after preparation of prospectus offering, that is as if they were offering 
shares to the general public (OICV-IOSCO, 2004). 
Chapter 12 of Bursa Listing Requirements (2012) dictates the governing rules for embarking on share 
repurchase activities in Malaysia. One of the most crucial disclosure requirements are the immediate 
announcement requirements for transactions purporting to have significant impact on firm valuation as 
laid down in Section F of the rule 12.18 to 12.23. Among other things, these rules are concerned with 
the effect on public shareholding spread, the resale of treasury shares and disclosure requirements that 
need to be furnished in company's annual report as well as notification on purchases of own shares, 
resale and cancel of the repurchased shares (treasury shares). Resale of treasury shares can only be 
executed after 30 days of repurchases. Among information that need to be disclosed in the immediate 
announcement of resale of treasury shares are the minimum price, maximum price, and the unit resale. 
Part C of Chapter 9 of Bursa Listing Requirements (2012) emphasizes the importance of disclosing 
material information in a timely manner (Part J: immediate disclosure requirements) as to promote fair 
distribution of material information to all users. 
The requirements also mandate that all activities related to repurchasing, reselling and cancelling of 
treasury shares should be included in the director's report of annual reports and in the notes to 
financial statement section. Furthermore, detail on these activities (repurchase, resale and cancel) of 
treasury shares should also include the effects on financial position. 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development. 
Majority of the previous studies on share repurchases have focused on determinants and price effects 
of announcement and actual repurchase of shares. For many countries, data on resale of treasury is 
difficult to obtain and companies always shy away from it because of its stringent rules (Cesari et al., 
201 1). This study is made possible as Malaysia has the advantage of providing complete and timely 
information on resale of treasury shares on Bursa Malaysia's website. 
2.2.1 Reasons for share repurchase 
Previous evidence examined various reasons on why companies repurchase their own shares. One of 
the main reasons is signaling of undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Abdul Latif, 2010, Abdul Latif 
et al., 2013). Other reasons include to i) disgorge excess cash flow (Dittmar, 2000, Oswald and 
Young, 2008), ii) substitute for dividend payment (Grullon, 2002, Abdul Latif & Taufil Mohd, 2013), 
ii) manage optimal capital structure (Dittmar, 2000, Abdul Latif, 2010), iii) provide shares for ESOS 
(Kahle, 2002, Abdul Latif, 2010), iv) reduce tax liability (Rau & Vermaelen, 2002 and Oswald & 
Young, 2008), and v) stabilize share price (Cesari et al., 201 1). Locally, Nasruddin and Angappan 
(2004) find that the main reason for repurchasing in Malaysia is to stabilize their share price. 
It is often argued that the main reason for companies to repurchase own shares is signaling of 
undervaluation. Companies believe that their shares are undervalued thus share repurchases may 
correct the mispricing. Many studies using developed market are supportive of signaling theory 
(Vermaelen, 1986; Ikenberry, 1995; Zhang, 2005). Similarly, studies in Malaysia provide evidence of 
signaling theory (Abdul Latif et al., 2013; Mansor, Zaidi & Swee Peng, 201 1; Mohd Jais & Chin, 
2001). These studies confirmed that companies gain significant and positive abnormal returns during 
the repurchasing period. 
Based on substitution hypothesis, it is argued that companies repurchase shares to substitute for 
dividend payment (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). One of the main reasons companies in the US prefer 
share repurchases over dividend payment is the inherent flexibility of share repurchases: i) flexibility 
in terms of how much to repurchase, ii) when to actually implement them, and iii) companies will not 
be penalized in case of nonperformance. However, Malaysian evidence by Abdul Latif and Taufil 
Mohd (2013) indicates that companies do not substitute dividend payments with share repurchases. 
Two unique features of repurchase activities by Malaysian companies are that they are frequent 
repurchasers and they bought back only small portion of companies shares (Abdul Latif, 2010). On 
average, Malaysian companies bought back only 1 percent of their own shares. In comparison, 
companies in the US bought on average 6 percent of their shares outstanding (Jagannathan & 
Stephens, 2003; lkenberry et al., 1995). Abdul Latif (2010) reports that Malaysian companies are 
frequent buyers of their own shares where 90 percent of the companies will repeatedly buy back their 
shares every year. 
2.2.2 Price reaction on share repurchases events 
Since there is lack of evidence on the price effects on resale of treasury shares, this study will evaluate 
on the price effect on share repurchases. A number of studies have been done on the price effects of 
share repurchases (Abdul Latif et al. 2013; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009; Zhang, 2005; Chan, Ikenberry 
& Lee, 2007; Ikenberry et al. 2000; Ikenberry et al., 1995). Many of these studies are supportive of the 
idea that companies gain significant abnormal returns on the announcement and actual repurchasing of 
companies shares both during the announcement period and in the long run thus are supportive of 
signaling hypothesis. 
Locally, Abdul Latif et al. (2013) examine the announcement effects and long run performance of 
repurchases for firms embarking on actual share repurchase between 1999 and 2006. Using both 
market model and market adjusted ret7:rn model for immediate price effects, the study found that 
companies gain significant abnormal returns during the actual repurchasing periods but not during the 
announcements of intention to repurchase. This means market considers actual repurchasing as 
positive news but market is indifferent to the mere intention of share repurchase. In other words, 
actual repurchasing of shares has significant information content while mere announcement of 
repurchases do not. It is argued that companies perceived their shares are undervalued and compelled 
to signal this belief by actually repurchasing their shares. The fact that market reacts positively to the 
repurchasing event dates confirmed that the prices were undervalued. For the long-run performance, 
Abdul Latif et al. (2013) use both cumulative abnormal return and buy and hold return methods to 
gauge for long run price effects. The study reveals that there is no different in price performance 
between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms regardless of the benchmarks used. There are mixed 
evidence on the market reactions to the announcement of share repurchases in Malaysia. This is due to 
sample selection, time period covered and methods used in determining price effects. Table 1 
summarizes studies on the share repurchases in Malaysia. 
Table 1 : Studies on share repurchases in Malaysia. 
Year-Data Measurement No. of companies** Focus 
used for sample 
selection 
Mohd Jais and Chin 1997-1998 All 34 announced SR Price effects 
(2001) 
Lim and Bacha 1997-2001 All 131 announced firms Price effects 
(2002) and 43 actual buy 
back 




Kadir & Abdullah 1999-2002 All events 30 events Price effects 
(2006) 
Mohd Jais 2009 2000-2005 All events 227 events Substitution 
Abdul Latif (2010) 1999-2006 All SR' of > I%* 82 
Edward Wong et al. 2006-2009 Top 100 cos** 35 
(20 1 1) 
Determinants 
and price effects 
Price effects 
Mansor et al. (201 1) 2001 -2005 All companies 149 Price effects 




Abdul Latif et al. 1999-2006 All SR' of > 1 %* 82 announced SR' Announcement, 
(20 13) and 77 long-run actual and long- 
actual SR' run price 
performance 
*All SR of > 1% means all share repurchasing companies that bought back at least 1% of its outstanding ordinary shares. 
SR' is share repurchases. 
2.2.3 Information asymmetry, mispricing, and efficient market hypothesis 
Fama (1965) introduced Efficient Market Hypothesis in finance literature and has made great 
contribution in many finance study regarding the association between company's events and stock 
price movement. Market is said to be efficient if prices can fully reflect available information (Fama, 
1970). There are three forms of market efficiency which are: i) weak, ii) semi-strong, and iii) strong. 
Market is considered weakly efficient when prices reflect historical data. Market is semi-strong 
efficient if prices reflect all publicly available information. Market is considered strongly efficient 
when prices reflect all data: historical, public and private information. In other words, strongly 
efficient market would reflect companies' intrinsic value. Finance literature indicates that there are 
several ways to measure market efficiency. One of the prominent ones is event study methods. The 
strong form of efficient market hypothesis posits that market is efficient whenever prices can fully 
reflect companies' true intrinsic value using all information available. Using variance ratio test, Kim 
and Shamsuddin (2008) find that Malaysian market is not efficient despite the financial liberation 
implementation since the eighties. Zaluki, Abdullah, Abdullah and Alassan (2012) find market reacted 
differently to the earning announcement released on Friday suggesting market is not truly efficient. 
Using 120 earnings announcements, Zaluki et al. found that market reacted negatively to earnings 
announcement but responded positively to losses announcements made on Friday. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that companies use financial policy change to signal to the market of 
their true intrinsic values. This argument was based on the premise that companies knew better about 
its own true value and were compelled to correct perceived market mispricing. Perceived market 
mispricing happened because of the presence of information asymmetry between insiders, i.e. the 
managers, and the outsiders. In the context of resale of treasury shares, it is argued that companies 
have privy information on its true value. Managers find that prices are stable or overvalued and are 
taking the opportunity to take advantage of the temporary price mispricing. 
Wang, Lin, Fung and Cheng (2013) examine two types of repurchasing firms: i) repurchase to retire 
and ii) repurchase to reissues shares. They find that firms that retire or cancel their treasury shares 
show a superior long-term performance than those that reissue their treasury shares. The result 
indicate that companies use repurchases to signal of their undervaluation that market and the fact that 
companies earn significant abnormal returns in the long run suggests that market underreacted when 
the repurchase news were first made public. Further evidence shows that the long-term price 
performance is positively related to firms' operating performance and dividend payouts in the post- 
repurchase period. 
2.2.4 Earnings performance and signaling theory 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that signaling theory is based on two general assumptions which are: 
i) managers are better informed than the shareholders and public concerning the future prospects of 
their firms and ii) given the better information available, managers can take certain action in an 
attempt to signal their better expectation of their firms' prospects. Managers are greatly concern on 
meeting company's financial targets such earnings per share (EPS) and dividend per share (DPS), to 
name a few. For example, Bartov, 2002 argues that managers strive to meet or beat EPS expectation. 
Kross, Ro and Suk (201 1) also provide evidence that management that have exhibit a smooth and 
consistent EPS pattern would more likely to make bad news to strategically maintain their earnings 
pattern. 
3.0 OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The first objective of the study is to examine whether resale of treasury shares events have 
information content. In other words, do the resale events trigger market movement? This can be 
achieved by examining the price effects surrounding the actual resale of treasury shares. Thus the 
hypothesis is as follow: 
HI : There is significant abnormal returns gained on actual resale of treasury shares. 
To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to assess the price effect on resale of treasury shares 
using Malaysian companies. 
The second objective is to assess if the percentage of shares resale is affected by company's previous 
price performance and financial indicator. It is argued that previous price performance especially in 
short window period would influence company's decision on the number of shares to be resold in the 
open market. It is also argued that EPS and lagged EPS being the most influential financial indicator 
of a company would have a significant influence on company decision on resale of treasury shares. 
The next hypotheses regarding the number of treasury shares resale would be: 
Hz : CAR negatively affects the proportion of share resale. 
H3 : LAGEPS (prior earnings per share) positively affects the proportion of share resale. 
H4 : EPS (current earnings per share) negatively affects the proportion of share resale. 
It is argued that managers have better information regarding its company's value and Malaysian 
managers typically own large portion of companies stock. Based on signaling theory, it is expected 
that managers would take certain actions to signal privy information (Abdul Latif, 2010; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Signaling theory posits that managers are motivated to inform the market if they 
perceived that there exists market mispricing as a result of information asymmetry between the 
insiders, i.e. the managers, and the outsiders. Therefore, managers would not likely to resale its shares 
if the price is perceived to be undervalued. That is the higher is the CAR prior to resale date, the lower 
is the proportion of share resale. 
LAGEPS and EPS are used as proxies for profitability. Using signaling theory, it is argued that 
company with high prior earnings (LAGEPS) would be more likely to resale their shares to the public. 
Companies believe that previous EPS would likely to endure in the future. Therefore, high LAGEPS 
would motivate companies to reissue treasury shares. The other way around is true for current EPS. 
Companies that perceive that their current EPS would not last and expect to have better EPS in the 
future. Therefore, companies with low current EPS would more likely to reissue or resale their 
treasury shares in the open market. 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
Data on all resale of treasury shares events from 2001 to March 2012 are collected from Bursa 
Malaysia website. Daily prices for each companies and Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) are 
collected from Thompson Datastream database. Researchers have used many event periods to capture 
on announcement price effects. MacKinlay (1997) suggests that the event period can be longer to 
adequately capture the price effects of the announcements. This study uses 1 1 -day event period (-5, +5 
days) to adequately capture any significant price changes due to possible information leakage. The 
estimation period of the market model is from day -90 to day -31 before the announcement date. 
Following McKinlay 1997, this study uses standard event study methodology namely market model 
(MM) and market adjusted return model (MAR) to gauge the abnormal gain during the announcement 
period of 11 days (-5,+5) surrounding the actual resale of treasury shares. 
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) is used as market or benchmark index. Daily prices for each 
company's resale events dates and the corresponding KLCI are gathered beginning from -90 days 
prior to the announcement date to the 5 days after the announcement date. 
Daily return for firm i on day t is computed as follow: 
R .  = P .  - P .  
I,t I , t  1.t-1 
P i,t-I 
where, 
Ri,t : return on firm i during day t 
Pi,t : price of firm i shares at the end of day t 
Pi,,, : price of firm i shares at the end of day t-1 
Similarly, the daily market return 
Rm,t = CI t - CI 1-1 
L.1 1-1 
where, 
R,,, : Return on Composite Index during day t 
CI, : Composite Index level at the end of day t 
Cit., : Composite index level at the end of day t-l 
Abnormal returns for each day t are computed by comparing daily firms' and market's returns as 
follows: 
where, 
AR ,,, is the abnormal return of i firm on day t, 
R,,, is return on firm i during the period t, 
R , ,  is return on Composite Index during the period t 
A A 
ai andpi  are parameters estimated using the estimation period if market model 
A A 
is used and a ,  = 0 and p, = 1 if market adjusted return model is used. 
Daily abnormal returns on each event day for all sample firms are cumulated and then divided by the 
number of observations to give the average abnormal returns (AAR) for the event day t as summarised 
below: 
2 AR(,  
AAR = i=l 
nt 
1 " 2 
where n is the number of firms on day t. The variance of AAR, using market model is 7 0 ei 
n 
2 
where 0 ,i is the variance of the residuals of firm i from market model estimation while for market 
1 " 
adjusted return, the variance is 7 C(A% , AAR, is normally distributed and Z- 
n i=1 
statistics is equal to AAR, divided by square root of the variance. 
Next, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) are calculated from an earlier date, tl to a 
later date, t2 
CAAR t ~ . t *  = f AAR t 
t = t l  
1 " t 2 
The variance of CAARtlVt2 for market model is --i-x o ( t l , t 2 )  , where o ii ( t l ,  t 2 )  = x o :i ( t) . 
" t = t l  
1 " 
The variance CAAR for market adjusted return is 7x (CAR i , , , , , 2  - CAAR ,,,,, )' , where 
" i = l  
CARi,tl,t2 is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i from period t l  to t2. CAAR,1,t2 is normally 
distributed and Z-statistics is equal to CAARt1,t2 divided by square root of the variance. It is 
hypothesized that immediate price effects on treasury shares resale is equal to zero. 
The second objective is to examine the factors that may influence the percentage of treasury shares 
resale. This is done using a simple OLS regression on the association between the numbers of share 
resale with the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) prior to the event dates, EPS and lagged EPS 
using the following equation: 
PRESALE = a + alCARit + a2LAGEPSit+ a3EPSit +&it 
Where, 
PRESALE : Percentage of shares resold by companies and is calculated as the number of 
shares resold scaled by total number of shares outstanding. 
CAR : Cumulative abnormal return 30 days prior to the actual resale date. 
LAGEPS : EPS in prior year, Datastream data 
EPS : Current EPS, Datastream data 
4.0 EMPIFUCAL ANALYSIS 
Table 2 presents the classification of sample firms based on Bursa Malaysia industry classification. 
For the period between 2001 and 2012, there were 95 companies embarked on resale of treasury 
shares exercises. The table shows that sample companies came from all different industry 
classification, many of these companies were categorized as industrial (3 1 companies or 32.6%) 
followed by companies in trading and services industry. 
Table 2: Sample firms and Bursa Malaysia industry classification 
No. of 
Industry classification cos YO 








Trading & services 
Total 
Table 3 tabulates the events on resale of treasury shares for all companies for the period between 2001 
and 2012. For the period, there were a total of 626 events undertaken by 95 unique companies. Abdul 
Latif (2010) reports that some of the unique criteria of Malaysia share repurchases is that many of the 
repurchasing firms are repeat buyers, they repurchases shares throughout the year , and they buy in 
small portion. Likewise, this study also finds that Malaysian firms exercise repeat resale of their 
treasury shares. From the total 626 resale events, 493 or 78 % are recurring resale events and from the 
total of 95 unique companies, 41 companies or 43% repeatedly resale their treasury shares. Hume 
Industries was the first to successfully embark on 10 resale exercises in 2001 but Hume Industries was 
finally delisted in 2010. Chart 1 map the resale of treasury shares events from 2001 to 2012. There is 
only one company that embarked on 10 resale events in 2001. The trend is increasing and reaches its 
peak in 2007 where there are 32 companies involved in making 159 resale events. The highest number 
for resale of treasury shares events coincides with 2007 Global financial crisis. Possible explanation is 
that companies do not want to risks on further depressing prices and reselling their shares would help 
increase stock liquidity to some extend and also bring in cash for the companies' internal need. 
The numbers of resale events and resale companies continue to fall significantly in 2008. In 2009, 
there seems to be a drastic increased in resale events and resale companies. Detail analysis indicate 
that many of these companies repurchase their shares in small proportion of their outstanding shares 
but resale their treasury shares in significant proportion or almost all of their available treasury shares. 
This could possibly explain why these companies taking many years after repurchasing shares prior to 
resale of their shares in the open market. 
Table 3:  Number of resale of treasury shares events from 200 1 to 20 12 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 201 1 2012 TOTAL 
Resale events 10 5 9 18 35 89 159 12 121 88 26 57 626 
Repeat events 9 4 6 14 32 77 132 8 108 79 17 48 493 
Companies 1 2 5 5 4 15 32 9 18 14 14 17 136 
New cos 1 1 3 4 3 12 27 4 13 9 9 9 9 5 
Chart 1: Resale of treasury share events 




Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. The mean (median) number of units of 
treasury shares reissue on the open market is 5,5 15,921 (2,116,994) units at prices higher than 
acquisition costs. Out of 74 firms that resale their treasury shares, 4 firms experience losses, two firms 
earn zero return while the rest of resale companies enjoy significant gain that can be used for 
operational activities. Resale companies typically resale 2.0 percent of its outstanding shares measured 
in units, PRESALE. Premium or return is calculated as price sold divided by unit cost and minus 1. 
On average companies gain 70 percent premium for resale of treasury shares. Typically, companies 
gain on average RM2.6 million from resale of treasury shares transactions and in 2009, Top Glove 
earned the maximum value of RM44.5 million by selling its treasury shares in the open market. 
Table 5 presents group statistics for different of two means for the sample when the companies are 
divided equally on the amount of median gain received on resale of treasury shares transactions. The 
median for gain received is RM486,065 as presented in Table 4. Table 5 indicates that both of these 
groups (those that gain more than median value and those that gain less than median value) are 
statistically different in all categories of unit sold, percentage of treasury shares resale and premium 
received. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Median Min Max Std 
unit resale 5,5 1 5,92 1 2,116,994 9000 75733000 12254195.05 
unit cost 1.817 1.067 0.124 8.180 1.788 
Total unit cost 14,3 18,175 2,521,300 4,950 424,588,550 54,136,381 
Price sold 2.529 1.344 0.148 14.140 2.827 
RM Sold 
Premium 
Gain on resale 2,653,124 486,065 (4,862,508) 44,550,24 1 6,894,345 
PRESALE 2.04% 0.99% 0.0008% 15.42% 2.93% 
Table 5: Group Statistics 
Median Std. Std. Error sig 2- 
gain N Mean Deviation Mean t-test tailed 
unit sold-AR 0 37 1,696,996 2,874,594 472,580 -2.804 .006*** 
1 37 9,334,846 16,3 17,474 2,682,576 
Premium 0 37 ,222 1.012 .I66 -3.148 .002*** 
1 37 1.195 1.584 .260 
PORESALE 0 3 7 1.27% 2.68% 0'44% -2.345 .022** 
1 37 2.82% 3.00% 0.49% 
**, *** indicate significant at 5% and 1% respectively. N is 74 and is based on the final number of firms established in Table 
6. 
Malaysian firms do not resale their shares in a single day. If this study considers all resale events, 
some companies will give undue weight to some companies. For example Pacific & Orient made 49 
resale transactions in 2009, while other companies make only 1 or two resale events. Furthermore, 
efficient market hypothesis argues that the effect on an event should be most pronounced on the first 
released of information. Repeated resale events would lessen the price signal to the market; therefore 
resale events are carefully selected according to: (a) first week event, (b) first year event (c) first event 
to capture the best price signal as follow: 
Table 6: Weekly, yearly and first events 
Total resale events 62 6 
Recurring less than 1 week 414 
...... Weekly events 212 (a) 
Less: more than once a year 104 
...... Yearly events 108 (b) 
Less more: than once 13 
First eventslunique companies ...... 9 5 
Delistedfdata unavailable 2 1 
...... Final companies or first event 74 (c) 
There are a total of 626 resale events from 2001 to March 2012. To choose first week events, we take 
all resale events of 626, and then exclude all other resale events that recur in less than a week. For 
example, if a firm repetitively resale its shares for many days in a week, only the first event is 
included so that the event is 7 days apart from the next event. This procedure produces 212 weekly 
events. For monthly event, only the first month event for the year is included in the analysis. The same 
procedure as in weekly events is used to select monthly events. This procedure produces 108 yearly 
events. Likewise, for yearly event; only the first event of the year is considered. This procedure 
produces 95 unique first time resale companies for years between 2001 and 201 1. There are 17 
companies with missing price data and therefore are not included in the sample. These screening 
procedures produced a sample of 78 companies .The announcements of treasury shares resale are then 
compared to the companies' disclosure in the annual reports to confirm its validity. There are 4 
announcement of treasury share resale that could not be traced to the company's annual report thus are 
excluded from the final sample of 74 companies. 
Table 7 compares the CAAR of 74 yearly events between day -5 to 5 using MAR and MM. 
Companies experience a positive and significant 4% (3.59%) CAAR during day -5 to day 0 using 
MAR (MM) respectively. Companies continue to experience positive and significant CAAR during 
the window period especially in the window period prior to the resale date. After the resale date, none 
of the CAR is significant using either MAR or MM. 
Window 
day-5 to 0 
day-5 to 5 
day-3to 0 
day-3 to 3 
day- 1 to I 
day-l to 0 
day 0 to 5 



































day0 to 3 -0.48% 0.0743 -0.5509 0.5817 1 -0.95% 0.0753 -1.0900 0.2757 









Table 8 presents the CAAR for yearly resale events using MAR and MM. Companies experience 
significant positive 4.2% (3.65%) CAAR during 5 days prior to the resale dates using MAR (MM) 
methods. The results are similar as in Table 3 where CAAR is positive and significant prior to the date 
of resale. 
Table 8: 108 Yearly events 
MAR 
window CAAR Z score p-value 
day-5 to 0 4.19% 5.5149 O.OOOO*** 
day-5 to5 3.72% 3.4277 0.0006*** 
day-3 to 0 3.01% 4.4501 O.OOOO*** 
day-3 to3 2.35% 2.2395 0.0251 **  
day-1 to 1 2.01% 3.7268 0.0002*** 
day-1 to 0 1.77% 3.7658 0.0002*** 
day 0 to 5 0.20% 0.2450 0.8064 
day 0 to 3 0.0 1 % 0.0143 0.9886 
MM 
CAAR Z score p-value 
3.65% 5.6648 O.OOOO*** 
2.68% 3.0724 0.002 1 *** 
2.77% 5.2656 O.OOOO*** 
1.81% 2.6061 0.0092*** 
1.87% 4.0933 O.OOOO*** 
1.66% 4.4542 O.OOOO*** 
-0.41% -0.6303 0.5285 
-0.39% -0.7470 0.4550 
**,*** indicate significant at 5% and 1% respectively. 
Table 9 summarizes the value of CAAR experienced by resale companies using weekly observations. 
Similar to the previous tables, companies experience positive and significant abnormal returns during 
day -5 to 0 with lower CAR values of 3% (2.5%) according to MAR (MM) respectively. CAAR using 
MAR for window periods after resale date are positive but insignificant. On the other hand, CAAR 
using MM are negative and insignificant after the date of actual resale. As a whole, companies 
experience positive and significant abnormal returns prior to the resale of treasury shares using all 
categories of events; first time, yearly or weekly. Companies experience significant and positive 
abnormal returns prior to the date of resale indicates that resale companies are on average better than 
the market. However, the abnormal returns quickly disappear after the event dates suggesting that 
market is quick to respond to the new information released thus is supportive of semi-strong form of 
efficient market hypothesis where prices fully reflect all publicly available information. 
Table 9: 212-Weekly events 
MAR 
day 0 to 5 0.77% 0.0758 1.4801 0.1389 1 0.43% 0.0767 1.0143 0.3104 
MM 
CAAR STDEV Zscore p-value 
day-5 to 0 2.89% 0.0660 6.39 1 1 O.OOOO*** 
day 0 to 3 0.67% 0.07 13 1.3648 0.1723 1 0.43% 0.072 1 1.2420 0.21 43 
*** indicates significant at 1%. 
CAAR STDEV zscore p value 
2.48% 0.0670 5.8436 O.OOOO*** 
The second objective is to examine the factors that influence the number of treasury share reissue or 
resale. Three important factors are examined in this study which are: companies current EPS, lagged 
EPS and the price performance prior to the date of resale. Table 10 presents the painvise correlation 
matrixes for variables used. Multi correlation is not an issue as none of the coefficient is higher than 
0.5. Breush-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity indicates that the value of chi2 is 26.4 and is significant 
at 1 percent level. To address this issue, standard robust error is employed and variance inflation 
factors are checked for the variables used in the model. 
Table 10: Pearson Correlations 
CAR30 LAGEPS EPS 
CAR30 1 
LAGEPS 0.036 1 
EPS -0.026 0.464" 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 1 1 : OLS regression with robust standard error 
PRESALE coef Robust std error t p-value VIF 
CAR30 -.0550 0.027 1 -2.03 0.023** 1 .OO 
LAGEPS .07009 0.0534 1.31 0.097* 1.28 
EPS -.0386 0.0224 -1.72 0.045** 1.28 
constant .0208 0.0049 4.27 0.000 
*,**,*** indicate significant at 10%,5% and 1% respectively, using 1-tailed tests. 
Table 1 1  presents the result OLS regression using robust standard error. The regression results are 
expected. CAR30 is cumulative abnormal return of 30 days prior to the actual resale date. It is a proxy 
for past immediate price performance. The result indicates that CAR30 is negatively and significantly 
related to the percentage of shares resale. This means that the lower is the prior abnormal returns; the 
higher will be the percentage of shares resold. It is expected that companies believe that their previous 
returns would not likely to reoccur and expect better returns in the future. Furthermore, it can be said 
that companies would not want jeopardize share prices or cause their share price to be lower due to 
reissuance or resale of treasury shares. As an analogy, whenever companies issue IPO (initial public 
offerings), the share prices would negatively be affected during the short window period. Likewise, as 
companies reissue their treasury shares, it is expected that the share price would negatively be 
affected. 
LAGEPS has a positive and marginally significant relationship to the number of shares resold. The 
higher is the LAGEPS, the higher is the number of shares to be resold by companies. It is implied that 
companies are optimistic on companies future accounting earnings and expect that those earnings 
would be able to sustain in the future. Current EPS is significantly and negatively affecting the 
number of shares resold. This means that the higher is the current EPS; the lower is the number of 
shares resold to the public. Given the high performance of current profitability in EPS, there is no 
need to be aggressive in selling companies' treasury shares as high EPS generally means high returns 
to shareholders and investors. 
5.0 CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND RUTURE RESEARCH 
The first objective of the study is to examine whether there is significant price reactions on the resale 
of treasury shares events in Malaysia. Using market model (MM) and market adjusted return model 
(MAR) on 3 categories of resale events, this study indicates that companies gain positive and 
significant abnormal returns before the actual resale date. This indicates that resale of treasury shares 
have information content. However, there were no abnormal returns gained following the actual resale 
dates regardless of event category or method used. The abnormal returns quickly disappear after the 
event dates suggesting that market is quick to respond to the new information released thus is 
supportive of semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis where prices fully reflect all publicly 
available information. 
The second objective is to assess the relationships between three companies' financial characteristics 
and the magnitude of shares resale, which is the percentage of shares resale in the open market 
(PRESALE). Based on signaling theory, it is found that both prior returns and current EPS are 
positively and significantly affecting the percentage of treasury shares resold in the market while 
LAGEPS has a negative and significant relationship with PRESALE. 
This study has several limitations. First, this study is limited to immediate announcement effect 
surrounding resale of treasury shares events. Future research may test on the persistence of the 
abnormal gains of treasury shares resale in the long-run. Besides signaling theory and information 
asymmetry, other underpinning theory of equity issuance can also be applied to resale of treasury 
shares context: for example, mispricing theory, corporate life cycle theory. Corporate governance 
mechanisms have long been known to have important implication on company's policy. Therefore 
incorporating them in the equation would more likely reveal i) type of companies that embarked on 
resale of treasury shares ii) price and operating performance of resale firms in the long run and iii) to 
what extent resale of treasury shares increase shareholders value. 
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